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Abstract  Much of the industrialized world is undergoing a significant 
demographic shift, placing strain on public pension systems. Policymakers are 
responding with pension system reforms that put more weight on privately managed 
retirement funds. One concern with these changes is the effect on individual welfare 
if individuals invest suboptimally. Using micro-level data from the United States and 
Germany, we compare the optimal expected lifetime utility computed using a 
realistically calibrated model with the actual utility as reflected in empirical asset 
allocation choices. Through this analysis, we are able to identify the population 
subgroups with relatively large welfare losses. Our results should be helpful to public 
policymakers in designing programs to improve the performance of privately 
organized retirement systems. 
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Much of the industrialized world is undergoing a significant demographic shift, with 
low birth rates and increasing longevity (see, e.g., United Nations, 2007). One 
consequence of the aging population is an increasing strain on public pension 
systems. Many such systems are pay-as-you-go plans, created under the expectation 
that inflow would be generated from current workers whose number exceeds the 
population of retirees. Today’s reality is a shrinking supply of workers relative to 
retirees.1 As a result of these changing demographics, concern is rising over the 
ability of government pay-as-you-go programs to remain viable. 
 
Policymakers are responding with a variety of pension system reforms. The general 
trend is to put more weight on funded, individually organized retirement systems. 
Shifting the burden of old-age provision to individuals raises a central question: How 
well are various population subgroups prepared to make financial decisions with 
respect to their old-age provision? To answer this question, we use micro-level data 
and investigate the performance of individual retirement wealth accumulation. 
Within the wealth accumulation process, we focus on asset allocation.2 Taking the 
existing government pension systems as given, we show the population subgroups 
for which public policy should implement improvement measures.3 
 
We further compare the performance of U.S. and German investors. This comparison 
is especially valuable because of the institutional differences in the respective 
retirement systems. The United States has a longer tradition for privately funded 
retirement systems, because government pensions historically have been less 
generous.4 Thus, we can investigate whether longer experience with individually 
                                                 
1  In the United States, for example, in 1950 the ratio of people aged 20 to 64 relative to 
those over age 64 was 7.25. Today that ratio is 4.71, and by 2030, the ratio is estimated to 
fall to 2.58 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Comparable values for Germany are 6.25 in 
1950, 3.13 for today, and an estimated 2.00 for 2030 (Federal Statistical Office, 2006).  
2  Savings adequacy, the second major decision within the allocation process, is addressed 
in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006). 
3  To address the generally insufficient of knowledge among European Union citizens with 
respect to the functioning of financial instruments necessary for old age, the Commission 
of the European Union sees the necessity to improve that knowledge. See press release 
IP/07/1954 on 12/18/2007: Financial services: Commission encourages better financial 
education for EU citizens. 
4  In 2004, 48% of retirement income for the population aged 65 and older was generated by 
Social Security, railroad retirement, or government employee pensions (see Social 
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funded systems leads to better asset allocation results. This further helps to determine 
in which direction reforms should alter a pension system—that is, toward more 
individually managed funding (and income provision) or not. 
 
To evaluate investment performance, we use a utility-based welfare benchmark. 
Alternative monetary-based benchmarks such as expected wealth (or quantiles of the 
distribution) at retirement (e.g., as in Poterba et al., 2007, or in Watson and 
Naughton, 2007) are not suitable because we assume heterogeneity in individual 
preferences and endowments. For example, for people with different degrees of risk 
aversion, it should be completely rational to follow asset allocation strategies with 
different types and amounts of risk and thus accept different levels in expected 
retirement wealth. Focusing only on expected retirement wealth, reforms may 
outweigh high-risk/high–expected wealth strategies.  
 
To calculate our welfare measure, we employ a method similar to Dammon, Spatt, 
and Zhang (2004); Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005); and Yao and Zhang 
(2005). As such, we compare the expected lifetime utility an individual receives 
following an optimal asset allocation pattern with the expected lifetime utility 
received following the investment strategy observed in our data. We achieve this by 
taking the following steps: First, we analyze data from two large data sets, the U.S.-
based Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the German Income and Expenditure 
Survey (EVS). Using a regression model, empirical asset allocation policy is 
estimated as a function of individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education) and 
endowments (income and wealth). Next, we calculate the optimal—that is, 
benchmark—asset allocation policy and the resulting expected utility. For this we 
solve the dynamic optimization problem given by a realistically calibrated life-cycle 
consumption/saving/asset allocation model with stochastic uninsurable labor income, 
asset returns, and life span. Finally, we place the empirical asset allocation policy 
functions, instead of the optimal functions, into the expected utility model and 
compare the resulting utility with the optimal one. 
 
Our results are highly relevant for policymakers in their deliberations about changes 
to public and private pension systems. We are able to identify the population 
                                                                                                                                          
Security Administration, 2006). In Germany, the government system (Gesetzliche 
Rentenversicherung) in 2003 provided around 66% of retirement income (Federal 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2005). 
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subgroups with relatively large welfare losses through suboptimal asset allocation 
decisions. Specifically, individuals in the United States with low financial wealth and 
in Germany with low income or medium wealth would benefit most from better asset 
allocations. Further analyses exhibit the impacts of gender, education, and age. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: A review of the literature in section 2 is followed 
in section 3 by the definition and calibration of the normative benchmark model. 
Section 4 describes the data used for our empirical investigation, and results of our 
econometric analyses are presented in section 5.  Building on the results of sections 4 
and 5, a welfare analysis—the utility-based comparison of theoretically optimal and 
actual behavior—is done in section 6. We summarize our results and derive policy 
implications in section 7. 
 
2 Relationship to Existing Literature 
As summarized by John Y. Campbell in his 2006 presidential address to the 
American Finance Association (Campbell, 2006), there are two general approaches 
to research on household finance: positive research, which investigates the actual 
behavior of people, and normative research, which aims to derive how people should 
behave according to a set of rational criteria. Our contribution confronts the former 
with the latter by measuring differences in utility (measured using a normative 
model) for individuals whose asset portfolios we observe deviate from the 
normatively given optimal asset allocation. 
 
2.1 Empirical Evidence – the Positive Research 
Because of their fundamental role in decision making under uncertainty, risk 
attitudes are of significant interest to policymakers and economists. Variations in 
attitudes across demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are relevant because 
of the ultimate implications in setting public policy, particularly with regard to 
financial, occupational, and similar decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that 
gender, marital status, education, ethnicity, wealth, income, and age are among the 
relevant factors associated with risk-taking behavior. 
 
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) use the University of Michigan Health and Retirement 
Study to test the relationship between risk attitudes and a variety of demographic 
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characteristics, both as observed in life insurance purchases and in a speculative job 
choice option. They observe that women are more risk averse than men in both 
domains,5 and that risk aversion is U-shaped in age. Higher education appears to 
increase risk aversion with regard to pure risk; yet, regarding speculative risk, 
education tends to increase the willingness to accept it. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) 
also observe that immigrants tend to be greater risk takers than nonimmigrants. They 
attribute this behavior to the self-selection aspect of immigrating in the first place.  
 
In the pension domain, Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997) use data on asset allocation 
choices in U.S. pension plans and find that investments in risky assets increase if the 
respondent is male, middle-aged, and wealthy. Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1997) 
find that women exhibit more risk aversion when making choices for assets in a U.S. 
pension fund. Employing a proprietary data set of U.S. 401 (k) pension plan choices, 
Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) find that men invest more in equities and trade 
more frequently than do women. They also find that being married and having higher 
income is associated with more aggressive investing behavior. Older age, however, 
leads to greater caution in asset allocations.6 Van Rooij, Kool, and Prast (2007) show 
that, in the Netherlands, men are generally less risk averse and would (if no 
restrictions forbade it) invest more in stocks than women and prefer a defined 
contribution plan to a defined benefit plan. For Australian investors, Watson and 
Naughton (2007) show that men choose riskier retirement plans.   
 
In the individual investment domain, using data from the 1998 wave of the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), Sunden and Surette (1998) investigate probabilities to 
invest mostly in stocks or mostly in bonds. Their results highlight marital status as a 
driver for investment behavior. Single men are more likely than single women and 
married men to invest mostly in stocks; married women, however, do not differ 
                                                 
5  The overview of the psychological literature given in Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) 
summarizes broad evidence that women exhibit more risk aversion than men. 
6  The results of Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) support this finding. Poterba and Samwick 
(2001) and Bertaut amd Starr-McCluer (2002), however, find a hump-shaped asset 
allocation pattern associated with age.  
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significantly from other groups with respect to the mostly stock probability. Single 
women are less likely than married women to choose mostly bonds. Using the same 
data set, Jianakoplos et al. (2003) find that not marital status per se but differences in 
financial endowments between married and nonmarried persons influence investment 
behavior. 
 
Using a large (22,000 respondents) German survey data set, supplemented with field 
experiments, Dohmen et al. (2005) find that greater risk aversion is associated with 
higher age and being female, and that these results are robust to income differences. 
In an interesting addition, the German survey allows consideration of risk attitudes 
across domains of career selection, sports and leisure, car driving, health, and 
financial matters. Results of the study suggest that domain matters in that the level of 
risk aversion or risk loving changes across situations, and financial lotteries do not 
appear to be particularly good predictors of actual behavior. Women are more risk 
averse than men in each domain. 
  
Guiso, Haloassos, and Japelli (2002) contains studies on asset allocation choices in 
several countries. The results presented reveal similarities but also differences across 
national borders, giving weight to our consideration of both U.S. and German data. 
Again, age, income, wealth, and gender turn out to be important factors. 
 
According to the literature, therefore, gender, marital status, education, ethnicity, 
wealth, income, and age all seem to affect risk-taking behavior.7  
 
2.2 Optimal Asset Allocations and Individual Welfare Considerations – the 
Normative Analysis 
2.2.1 Optimal Asset Allocations 
During the 1960s and 1970s, researchers gave significant attention to the problem of 
optimal life-cycle allocation of resources between consumption and saving and 
across types of assets (Phelps, 1962; Yaari, 1965; Mossin, 1968; Hakansson, 1969, 
                                                 
7  For further survey results see Barsky et al. (1997) and Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003). 
 7
1970; Merton, 1969, 1971; Samuelson, 1969; Richard, 1975; Kotlikoff and Spivak, 
1981). While optimal decision rules were economically logical—such as constant, 
age-invariant, proportional asset allocation for intertemporally separable constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility—they often failed to mirror actual behavior. 
The challenge posed to all researchers has since been to relax various rigorous 
assumptions that do not hold in reality, such as intertemporally separable utility, 
infinite time horizon, or perfect markets, where the individual can span all assets 
including human capital, or the absence of borrowing or short-selling restrictions. 
 
A growing body of research now offers optimal decision rules with increasing 
relaxation of such assumptions. Based on realistically calibrated consumption-
saving-asset allocation intertemporal optimization models, decisions depend on 
gender, education, age, human capital (i.e., the stock and riskiness of labor/pension 
income and pension age), wealth, taxation, transaction costs, and the likelihood of 
binding borrowing or short-selling restrictions.8 A detailed discussion of the specific 
impact of these factors based on the normative model used here is given in section 
3.3. 
 
2.2.2 Individual Welfare Considerations 
Section 2.1 presented evidence that individual investment behavior differs according 
to various factors such as age, wealth, income, and gender. Not surprisingly, different 
investment strategies lead to different wealth outcomes—for example, wealth at the 
beginning of retirement. More conservative investment strategies result in lower 
expected final wealth; for example, the simulation by Watson and McNaughton 
(2007) shows for Australian investors that women, being more-risk averse, end up 
with lower expected retirement wealth. 
                                                 
8  See Zeldes (1989); Deaton (1991); Carroll (1992, 1997); Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 
(1994, 1995); Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000); Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998); 
Viceira (2001); Campbell and Viceira (2002); Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2003); Gomes 
and Michaelides (2003, 2005); Haliassos and Michaelides (2003); Dammon, Spatt, and 
Zhang (2004); Lachance (2004); Cocco (2005); Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005); 
Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2005); Yao and Zhang (2005); Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos 
(2006); Post, Gründl, and Schmeiser (2006); and Polkovnichenko (2007).  
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But, as section 2.2.1 pointed out, differences in investment behavior can be a 
completely rational reaction to differences in preferences or endowments. For 
example, a highly risk-averse individual may be completely happy with low expected 
final wealth, if the volatility of the wealth distribution is also sufficiently low.  
 
Thus, a comparison of investment strategies should incorporate the rational 
contribution of preferences and endowments. For this, the literature uses the concept 
of lifetime utility. The actual behavior (in this study, the behavior is asset allocation) 
thus is compared with some benchmark behavior derived using the normative 
lifetime utility model. 
 
Research on comparisons of investment strategies and behaviors (including this 
contribution) measures utility costs—that is, losses in welfare—associated with 
deviations from the normatively determined optimal behavior. Among the important 
works are Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004); Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005;, 
and Yao and Zhang (2005). Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004) compare the expected 
lifetime utility of commonly observed investment choices with optimal choices. They 
undertake these measurements with respect to taxable and tax-deferred accounts. 
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) compare common investment advisers’ 
recommendations with the optimal choices and furthermore evaluate the effect of 
ignoring labor income or labor income risk while deriving the optimal choice. The 
welfare costs of not following an optimal renting versus owning a house strategy are 
calculated by Yao and Zhang (2005).9 
 
3 Optimizing Asset Allocations and Wealth over the Life-Cycle – The Normative 
Benchmark Model 
In this section, the normative benchmark model is defined and calibrated with 
empirical data. We derive the optimal asset allocation—depending on the 
                                                 
9  Poterba et al. (2006) also use a utility-based benchmark for investigating the performance 
of DB and DC plans, but restrict the measurement of utility to the wealth distribution at 
one single point in time (age 63), thus abstracting from life-cycle effects. 
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individual’s characteristics—over the life cycle. Based on this model, hypotheses for 
the econometric analyses are formulated in section 5.1. 
 
3.1 The Individual’s Problem 
For our normative analysis, we use the workhorse for solving intertemporal 
allocation problems, discounted utility. The individual maximizes the expected utility 
of consumption C (all monetary variables are stated in nominal terms) over his or her 
stochastic life span. The intertemporally separable utility function U(C) is defined as: 
 












∑ ∏ . (1)
 
T denotes the maximum life span, x the current age, δ the subjective discount factor, 
and pt the probability of the individual to survive from period t – 1 to t. We assume 
no bequest motives; thus, the one-period CRRA-utility function Ut(Ct), with γ as the 
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as long as the individual lives and 0 otherwise. Ct stands for nominal consumption at 
time t and is adjusted for inflation at rate π. 
 
At each point in time t, the individual decides how much to consume (implicitly 
determining savings) and how to allocate savings. Financial wealth at time t is 
denoted by Wt, henceforth called “cash on hand” (Deaton, 1991). Savings St are 
allocated to both a risk-free investment and a risky investment. The proportion of 
savings invested riskily each period, αt, earns the risky return Rt whereas the rest (1 – 
αt) is compounded at the risk-free return Rf . We assume that the individual cannot 
borrow money or short-sell stocks. The individual earns stochastic labor income Lt 
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from age x to age 64 at the end of each year t. In later periods, from age 65 to T, Lt is 
replaced by a deterministic (government) pension income that stays constant in real 
terms. Thus, the retirement age is exogenously fixed at age 65. 
 
The maximization problem is given by: 
 
( )( )0,max Et tC U Cα , (3)
 
subject to consumption constraints: 
 
( ) { }
0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 11 1, 2,..., ,
t
t t t f t t t t t
C W S
C S R S R L S t T x
W
α α− − − − − −
= −




subject to borrowing constraints: 
 
0 ≤ St ≤ Wt ,  (5)
 
and subject to no-short-sale constraints: 
 
0 ≤ αt ≤ 1. (6)
 
3.2 Calibration 
In this section we calibrate our model for U.S. and for German individuals. We 
report the choice of our benchmark parameters, but also give alternative values that 
will be used for sensitivity analyses later in the paper. Table 1 summarizes the 
calibration. 
 
The individual’s preferences are described by setting the constant of relative risk 
aversion γ  to 2 (alternatively to 1 or 3), the subjective discount factor δ to 0.97 
(alternatively to 0.95 or 0.99), which are typical values found in intertemporal 
optimization models (see, e.g., Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998). 
 
For the U.S. survival probabilities, we use the United States Life Tables 2003 (see 
Arias, 2006); for German survival probabilities, we use the Life Table for Germany 
2002/2004 from the German Federal Statistical Office (see Federal Statistical Office, 
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2003). Both tables reflect average population mortality, have a maximum age of 100 
years, and are subdivided for males and females. 
 
As proxy for the risky asset, we use the return of a broad-based stock market index. 
Stock market returns are assumed to be lognormal and i.i.d. (see, e.g., Hull, 2005). 
For the United States, we use data from 1926 to 2006 from Morningstar (see 
Morningstar, 2007). After deducting typical transaction costs of an index-investment 
fund of 0.7% per annum, the mean of Rt is given by 1.1151, and the standard 
deviation is 0.1996. For Germany, we use 1955–2006 data provided by Professor R. 
Stehle, Ph.D., Chair of Banking and Stock Exchanges, Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin (Germany), which give mean 1.1264 and standard deviation 0.2792 for Rt 
after assuming identical transaction costs. 
 
For the risk-free asset return, the short-term money market is used as a proxy. Given 
the same sample periods, the Rf is set to 1.0361 per annum for the United States (see 
Morningstar, 2007) and to 1.0472 for Germany (see IMF International Financial 
Statistics Online database, http://ifs.apdi.net/imf), again after assuming typical 
transaction costs of an index-based investment of 0.18%. 
 
For inflation, we use the same sample period, resulting in a value of 0.031 for the 
United States (see Morningstar, 2007) and 0.0279 for Germany (see Federal 
Statistical Office, 2007). 
 
The labor income process is calibrated to match empirically observed life-cycle 
income profiles. Ideally, we would like to have estimates that reflect the labor 
income process as given by data used also in the regression analysis later. But our 
data are cross-sectional and thus not well suited for this. Panel data that include both 
detailed longitudinal information on labor income and asset allocation for longer 
sample periods are, especially for Germany, not available. Thus, we decided to take 
income profiles from the literature that uses panel data.  
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For the United States, the mean real growth rates of income during the life cycle 
before retirement (until age 64) are taken from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). 
The profiles are age and education (low, middle, high), but not gender specific. For 
Germany, we use profiles based on Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) and Behr et 
al. (2003). These profiles are age, education (low, middle, high) and gender specific. 
In both, the United States and Germany, real income profiles are in general hump-
shaped in age; in nominal terms (applying the inflation rate defined above), they can 
be monotonically increasing in age. During retirement, labor income is exogenously 
replaced by (government) pension income by multiplying the income at age 64 with 
a replacement factor. For this we use “prospective” replacement factors, reflecting 
expected future replacement ratios. For the United States, we use a value of 35% (see 
Reno and Lavery, 2007), for Germany we use a value of 40% (see Börsch-Supan and 
Wilke, 2004). 
 
To reflect the fact that labor income is risky, we model each period’s labor income to 
be lognormally distributed and subject to transitory shocks.10 The mean of Lt is given 
by the current income at t = -1 with the growth rates and inflation described above. 
Until age 64, the standard deviation for U.S. individuals is set to 0.19 · E(Lt) (see 
Carroll and  Samwick, 1997). For German individuals, we do not have empirical 
estimates and use 0.05 · E(Lt), which should reflect that in the German welfare state, 
income risks are comparatively lower than in the United States. From age 65—that 
is, during retirement—we assume no labor income uncertainty. 
 
For our calculations we finally assume no taxes. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the calibration of the model parameters. 
 
                                                 
10 The literature contains much controversy about whether shocks to labor income are 
permanent or transitory. Newer empirical evidence gives mixed results (see, e.g., 
Guvenen, 2007). Because using transitory shocks makes the computational solution of the 
optimization problem much faster, we implemented only transitory shocks. 
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Table 1: Parameter Calibration for the Benchmark Model 
 
--- put Table 1 here --- 
 
The optimization problem (3)–(6) is solved backward via stochastic dynamic 
programming. Further details are given in Appendix A.  
 
3.3 Asset Allocations According to the Benchmark Model 
In this section, we show how individual optimal asset allocations—that is, the 
percentage share of savings invested into the risky asset—are influenced by the 
various input parameters. The results will serve as hypotheses for the empirical 
estimations in section 5 and build the basis for analyzing welfare effects in section 6. 
We describe the impact of risk aversion, the subjective discount factor, the survival 
probability, age, education, gender, the capital market environment, cash on hand, 
and expected labor income. We begin with an explanation of the effect of cash on 
hand and expected labor income, because some of the other effects depend on the 
ratio of expected labor income to cash on hand.  
 
Whereas in a model without labor income the individual’s risky asset share is age, 
time, and cash on hand invariant, here, the risky asset share increases in the labor 
income–to–cash on hand ratio, because labor income serves partially as a risk-free 
asset (Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005) and due to diversification 
effects (Gollier, 2001). Note that the CRRA feature of the one-period utility function 
still can result in an asset allocation that is invariant with respect to some fixed value 
of the labor income–to–cash on hand ratio, if the cash on hand and labor income are 
perfectly scaled. This means that, for example, while doubling cash on hand and 
expected labor income, the asset allocation stays constant, if expected labor income 
is doubled in all future periods.11  
                                                 
11  Note that, if leaving, for example, the discounted value of expected labor income constant 
but changing the shape of the life-cycle income profile over the life cycle would, in 
general, result also in a change in asset allocation, because the likelihood of binding no-
short-sale or borrowing constraints in future periods is changed. 
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A typical shape of the investment into the risky asset as a function in the labor 
income–to–cash on hand ratio is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Investment into the risky asset as a function in the labor income–to–
cash on hand ratio for German (EVS) data, Gender = 0 (male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, 
Age = 30, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 1  here --- 
 
The impact of risk aversion on the risky asset share is straightforward. The risky 
asset share decreases with increasing values for γ. The impact of a change in the 
subjective discount factor δ depends on the individual’s expected labor income. Both 
increases and decreases of the risky asset share are possible. In general, increasing δ 
will result in higher savings, because the individual places more weight to future 
utility. By saving more, the individual’s expected labor income decreases relative to 
the higher saving–induced increase in cash on hand, thus resulting in a lower risky 
asset share. But putting more weight on future utility also implies that the 
individual’s value of future labor income is larger (less discounted), and thus the 
risky asset share can also increase. The overall effect in general is rather small. 
 
Having a higher life expectancy—that is, higher one-period survival probabilities pt 
(like women have compared to men)—is similar to an increase in δ. Thus, the overall 
effect is small and ambivalent. 
 
Increasing age has generally a negative impact on the risky asset share given some 
fixed value for the labor income–to–cash on hand ratio which is illustrated in Figure 
2. With increasing age the amount of expected future labor income decreases, 
leading to a lower risky asset share. The kink at age 66 results rather from a 
measurement effect: the retirement-induced drop in income at the end of age 65 
lowers the labor income–to–cash on hand ratio for a fixed value of cash on hand 
ratio. Thus, in order to stay on a line in Figure 2, i.e., hold the labor income–to–cash 
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on hand ratio constant for measuring the risky asset share, cash on hand also has to 
decrease. Consequently, from the perspective of this lowered amount of cash on hand 
the overall discounted value of future labor income is relatively larger leading to an 
increase in the risky asset share. Note that in reality, i.e., in a situation where more 
factors than age will change at the same time, one would expect the individual to 
jump at retirement from one line to another, reflecting a drop in the labor income–to–
cash on hand ratio. 
 
Figure 2: Investment into the risky asset as a function in age for German (EVS) 
data, Gender = 0 (male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 2  here --- 
 
The effect of education on the risky asset share in our model is solely driven by 
differences in expected future labor income. Higher education is associated with 
higher growth rates of labor income during the life cycle, resulting in higher 
expected labor income (for a given current income), leading to a higher risky asset 
share. 
 
Gender enters the benchmark model at several points. Women have a higher life 
expectancy and (for the German calibration) lower expected growth rates for future 
labor income than men (assuming for the moment no differential in relative risk 
aversion). Ignoring the rather small effect of higher survival probability of women, 
their risky asset share should be smaller than the share of men. Assuming further that 
women are more risk averse (higher γ), we further expect a smaller risky asset share. 
 
The effect of capital market conditions is highlighted by comparing U.S. and German 
capital market data in Table 1. U.S. and German investors can expect a similar equity 
risk premium (nominal around 8%; in real terms around 5%), but at a considerably 
smaller standard deviation. Consequently, U.S. individuals should invest a higher 
share into risky assets. For example, an American CRRA-investor with zero labor 
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income (other parameters at base values) would invest 100%, and a German investor 
would invest around 61% into the risky asset. 
 
After deriving these general theoretical results, we continue with a description of the 
data used in our regressions. 
 
4 Data Description and Sample Selection 
For the United States, we use data from the 2004 wave of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF). The data set contains detailed information on 4,519 households, 
including household demographics, assets and liabilities, income, and other 
characteristics.12 Data have been collected by a dual frame sample design. Data for 
about 3,000 households are drawn from a representative sample of households in the 
United States to reflect characteristics that are broadly distributed in the population, 
such as home and vehicle ownership. The other set of 1,500 survey cases are drawn 
from an oversampling of wealthy households (based on tax records) to represent 
characteristics such as investment behavior, which might be disproportional in 
wealth. Furthermore, missing values are systematically imputed by a multiple 
imputation technique, so that the data set includes 22,595 records (i.e., 4,519 cases 
times 5 implicates). 
 
For Germany, we employ data from the 2003 wave of the Income and Expenditure 
Survey (EVS). The available data set for scientific use also includes numerous data 
on income, asset allocation, liabilities, and expenditures of 42,744 private 
households.13  
 
Because we are particularly interested in individual differences in investment 
behavior, we only analyze data on persons that are neither married or live with a 
partner. This assures that the decision observed was made by, for example, either a 
                                                 
12  See Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006) for an overview of the SCF. 
13  In the 2003 survey, 53,432 households were originally interviewed. The data set for 
scientific use, though, was made anonymous, which has resulted in an exclusion of 20% 
of the household data. 
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woman or a man (among other characteristics of a respondent) and enables us to 
extract individual-specific characteristics from the data.14 We exclude all self-
employed individuals from the analysis. For the United States, self-employed 
individuals represent 7.9% (based on the weight given in the data set); for Germany, 
4.3% of individuals in the data set are self-employed. This exclusion was necessary, 
because, in the German data, the value of one’s own business—a major part of the 
asset allocation among those who are self-employed—is not reported. Furthermore, 
we excluded cases that are located below zero in the income and net worth 
distribution. 
 
Another restriction is given by the welfare analysis in section 6 that builds on the 
intertemporal optimization model of section 3. The data and regression results serve 
as input for section 6. The underlying optimization model does—as a standard 
assumption—not allow for borrowing and short-selling. Deleting individuals having 
debt would exclude the majority of U.S. respondents, which is not desirable. Instead, 
we deducted debt from the amount of investments made into the risky asset—that is, 
we treated debt as a negative asset. Thus, finally we had to exclude only individuals 
for whom the resulting risky asset share variable used in our optimization (see 
section 3.1) and regression (see section 5.2) models was below 0% (15.5% of 
weighted cases for the United States and 5.9% for Germany). 
  
Our final SCF data set reduces to a sample size of 894 cases (4,470 records divided 
by 5 implicates), and the EVS data set contains 10,764 cases. 
 
Table 2 shows country-specific descriptive statistics on demographic and financial 
characteristics of our sample. The variables finally used in our regression analyses 
are in italics. For the U.S. data, the statistics are based on the weight given in the data 
set to account for the oversampling of wealthy.   
                                                 
14  Using households with more than one person would make inferences about individual 
behavior almost impossible. Household decisions would reflect some kind of average 
preferences and would implicitly incorporate numerous not directly observable 
diversification effects (e.g., with respect to labor income risks or life span uncertainty).  
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Table 2: 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and 2003 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (EVS) (for definition of variables, see Appendix B)  
 
--- put Table 2 here --- 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 include two variables indicating the amount of 
risky assets. The first, risky 1, is a more traditional measure (e.g., as in Bertaut and 
Starr-McCluer, 2002, or Eymann and Börsch-Supan, 2002) including stocks and 
similar investments (see Appendix B). The second, more broadly defined measure, 
risky 2, includes the value of real estate and, as negative investments into risky 
assets, debt (assuming that debt is risky). Risky 2 will be used in our regressions 
later, and thus we concentrate on this measure in the following discussion. 
 
Comparing the United States and Germany, we observe that Americans invest a 
higher share into the risky asset (58% vs. 39%). But we also see that the variables 
referring to financial wealth and income vary to a great extent in both countries, and, 
thus, as the benchmark model revealed, a regression model should control for that. 
 
 
5 Econometric Analyses 
5.1 Hypotheses about the Investment Process and Implications for Regression 
Models 
In the literature (e.g., Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002; Eymann and Börsch-Supan, 
2002), two general hypotheses about the investment process are discussed. The first 
assumes that the choice to invest into risky assets is made simultaneously with the 
decision on the share of wealth invested. The second hypothesis assumes a two-stage 
investment process. At the first stage, the individual decides whether to invest in the 
risky asset; at the second stage, the share is independently derived. The rationale for 
this two-stage process is that, before investing in risky assets, costly information 
must be obtained (e.g., college education); if these costs are prohibitively high, no 
investment is made at all.  
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The normative benchmark model from section 3 is based on a simultaneous decision 
process. Consequently, we use an empirical estimation strategy that is compatible 
with such behavior, a tobit model (Tobin, 1958). This model takes into account that 
the dependent variable (percent risky 2) is censored at 0 and 1. The underlying 
economic interpretation is that individuals having the value of, for example, 0 for the 
risky asset share would actually invest negative shares, but are restricted from doing 
so. 
 
5.2 Variable Selection and Expected Signs of Coefficients 
The selection of variables is based on the input variables of the normative benchmark 
model of section 3. The dependent variable is the risky asset share of investments, 
“percent risky 2”. Our dependent variable includes the usual risky assets, but also 
real estate and with a negative sign debt. Of course, houses are not as liquid as 
stocks, but there is some evidence that individuals adjust their house size according 
to their individual situation—that is, they consider the possibility of trading in real 
estate (see Banks et al., 2007).15 The final variable percent risky 2 is obtained by 
dividing risky assets by net worth, thus considering debt in both the numerator and 
denominator implicitly. 
 
As indicated in Table 2, the independent variables are those that are good candidates 
to be compatible with the input for the benchmark model. Thus, we included age, age 
squared, dummy variables for gender (female vs. male), education (low or high vs. 
middle), occupation (retired vs. employed), the ratio of labor income to net worth (as 
a proxy for the labor income–to–cash on hand ratio), and, finally, allowing for non-
CRRA behavior, the logs of labor income and net worth.16 
 
                                                 
15  To include the housing (e.g., Cocco, 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005) or debt (e.g., Davis, 
Kubler, and Willen, 2005) decision or both simultaneously (De Jong, Driessen, and Van 
Hemert, 2007) into a normative model is possible in general, but it would render our 
optimization approach computationally intractable, due to the large number of cases to be 
considered (see section 6). 
16  For a CRRA investor, the ratio of labor income to net worth alone is sufficient to 
determine the risky asset share. 
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From the general results of the benchmark model in section 3.3, the expected sign of 
the combined effect of age and age squared is negative, the occupation retired 
dummy  variable should have a positive sign (see Figure 2). For the gender dummy 
variable, the expected sign could be negative due to risk-aversion differentials, and 
expected labor income (growth rate) differentials according to gender. The expected 
sign of low education is negative and of high education is positive, due to expected 
labor income (growth rate) differentials according to education. Labor income and 
net worth should both have zero coefficients, and the labor income/net worth should 
be positive if the individual acts according to the CRRA benchmark. Otherwise, the 
combined effect of the three variables should at least imply an upward-sloping curve 
as shown in Figure 1 for CRRA-similar behavior. 
 
Finally, U.S. investors should (due to the better risk-return trade-off of the risky 
asset) for any values of the explanatory variables invest a higher share into the risky 
asset than German investors. 
 
5.3 Regression Results and Discussion 
Table 3 displays the results of our regression analyses.  
 
Table 3: Determinants for Share of Risky Assets (Tobit Regression); Dependent 
Variable: Percent Risky 2 (for definition of variables, see Appendix B) 
 
--- put Table 3 here --- 
 
The age effect (age, age2) for the United States is hump-shaped, peaking at an age of 
54; for Germany, the age and age2 coefficients imply a downward-sloping age 
effect.17 Taken together with the positive occupation retired dummy variable for 
                                                 
17  Both coefficients are insignificant at the 10% level. Using only age or age2 in our 
regression equation produces coefficients with negative signs that are significant at the 
1% level. Thus, the overall effect of age on asset allocation is clearly negative. The 
coefficients using both variables become insignificant due to the strong correlation 
between them.  
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Germany, the German results confirm the predictions. The U.S. results are rather 
mixed, the occupation retired dummy variable has a negative and insignificant 
coefficient and the age effect alone is only from age 54 on compatible with the 
predictions.  
 
The gender dummy variable has the expected sign for Germans: women invest 4 
percentage points less into risky assets after controlling for other effects, indicating 
more risk-averse behavior. The U.S. results are surprising: women invest 5 
percentage points more in risky assets. Thus, our analysis to this respect contradicts 
previous empirical evidence and also stands in contrast to the predictions from the 
normative model. Similarly, the German education coefficients show the expected 
sign, but the opposite is true for the U.S. education coefficients.  
 
The combined effect of labor income and cash on hand is clearly diametrical to the 
normative model for U.S. individuals. For any combinations of labor income and net 
worth, the risky asset share is a negative function in the labor income–to–net worth 
ratio (compare Figure 1). For German investors, the results are mixed. While varying 
the labor income–to–net worth ratio (and consequently labor income or/and net 
worth at the same time), the resulting function of the risky asset share is u-shaped; 
thus, only after reaching the minimum did it match the predictions of the benchmark 
model. Because both the coefficients for the logs of labor income and net worth are 
unequal to zero, the location of the minimum depends on the absolute values of the 
two variables and not only on their ratio. In general, we need ratios of labor income 
to net worth of a magnitude de of 200 to reach the minimum (from the left). Thus the 
predictions of the benchmark model hold in tendency rather for very small net worth 
holdings.  
 
The hypothesis that U.S. investors should invest a higher share into risky assets than 
Germans (due to the for CRRA utility better risk-return trade-off of the risky asset) 
does not hold. The coefficients for high education, log(net worth), and 
labor Income/net worth allow for many combinations of the explanatory variables 
that result in a lower risky asset share for U.S. investors. 
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6 Welfare Analyses 
In this section, we analyze the welfare consequences for the individuals in the SCF 
and EVS data sets that result from choosing different asset allocations than proposed 
by the normative model.  
 
We utilize an equivalent wealth variation measure as, for example, in Brown (2001). 
The optimal expected utility as given by the value function18 for t = 0 from the 
benchmark model V0*(W0, L0) is compared with the expected utility resulting from 
actual behavior V0act(W0, L0). For each individual, equation (7) is solved for ∆W0 and 
then divided by W0 to obtain a relative measure. 
 
V0*(W0, L0) = V0act(W0 + ∆W0, L0). (7)
 
The relative measure ∆W0 / W0 has the advantage of enabling comparisons of U.S. 
and German individuals without having to consider differences in the purchasing 
power of dollars and euros and comparisons of individuals with different 
endowments (cash on hand and expected labor income). The economic interpretation 
of ∆W0 / W0 is the answer to the following question: How much wealthier, on an 
expected utility basis, would an investor feel if he or she chose an asset allocation 
according to the benchmark model? Small values of ∆W0 / W0 indicate that changing 
asset allocation toward the normative result would not enhance expected utility a lot, 
whereas large values of ∆W0 / W0 indicate that the individual could be considerably 
better off—that is, he or she gives away a lot of utility by not following the 
benchmark model. Thus, another interpretation of ∆W0 / W0 is that it measures the 
welfare loss due to suboptimal behavior. 
 
The specification of V0act(W0, L0) includes the actual behavior with respect to asset 
allocation, as predicted by the regression equation of the tobit model. The decision 
with respect to consumption Ct(Wt) (and saving) is assumed to follow the normative 
                                                 
18  See Appendix A. 
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benchmark in each period. Thus, our results measure only the welfare effects that 
arise from choosing a suboptimal asset allocation.19 
 
To calculate the welfare effects, we chose a certain subsample to avoid extremely 
long computation times (the SCF and EVS data sets contain 11,658 total cases). For 
this, we chose three ages: 30, 50, and 65. For each age group, cash on hand (net 
worth) is varied continuously,20 whereas for labor income, the 25%, 50%, and 75% 
age-specific quantiles as given by the data are assigned to the individuals.21 Next, the 
welfare measure is calculated for these individuals assuming a relative risk-aversion 
parameter γ of 2 and a subjective discount factor δ of 0.97 for different values of 
gender (male, female) and education (low, middle, high). Furthermore, the 
preference parameters γ and δ are varied according to the calibrations shown in Table 
1.  
 
The analysis of our results begins with the outcome of the model calibrated with U.S. 
data. After this, we discuss the German results. Finally, we compare both countries 
and draw general conclusions. In general, U.S. and German individuals invest too 
little in risky assets. Thus, losses in welfare are significantly influenced by the size of 
the (positive) gap between the optimal and the empirical investment share of the 
risky asset. 
 
6.1 Results for U.S. Individuals 
Figure 3-SCF shows how the loss in welfare is influenced by net worth, labor 
income, and gender: 
 
                                                 
19  Savings adequacy is addressed in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006). Furthermore, 
the SCF data set does not provide information on consumption and savings. 
20  For this we can utilize the CRRA feature of the value function with respect to Wt. 
21  Precisely, we also included the neighbouring age groups (e.g., 29 and 31 in case of age 
30) to calculate the quartiles in order to avoid too much distortion due to a low amount of 
cases in some age groups.  
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Figure 3: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data;  
Gender = 0 (male) or 1 (female), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, Age = 50, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 3 here --- 
 
Figure 3 shows that the loss in welfare is usually larger for higher levels of labor 
income. In general, the welfare loss due to variations in income is influenced by 
three factors. First, higher income relative to net worth is associated with lower 
savings (income crowds out savings). At higher levels of income, savings are often at 
or near zero. Thus, for those with high income, asset allocation sometimes does not 
matter at all (in case of zero savings) or does not matter much. This effect explains 
why the 75% income quantile curve is lower at low levels of net worth. Second, for 
those with higher income, the benchmark model predicts increasing shares of risky 
asset holdings. But the coefficient for labor income/net worth from the regression 
works in the opposite direction. Thus, the higher the income, the larger is the gap 
between optimal and empirical risky asset shares, and the larger is the loss in 
welfare. This effect explains why the 75% income quantile curve mostly lies above 
the 50%, and the 50% above the 25% curve. Third, the loss in welfare is measured in 
percent of current net worth. For low levels of net worth, most of the individual’s 
overall expected lifetime wealth derives from expected future labor income (future 
net worth). Thus, losses in welfare due to suboptimal asset allocation mainly stem 
from investing future labor income payments suboptimally (as opposed to current 
wealth for wealthy individuals). Relative to the considerably smaller level of current 
net worth, the losses thus are proportionally larger. The last effect also explains the 
horizontal order of the curves and, for the 25% and 50% line, the generally 
decreasing tendency in net worth.  
 
Varying net worth (and always implicitly the ratio of labor income to net worth) 
produces a fourth effect that results in a decreasing shape of the curves. As stated 
above, for increasing net worth (i.e., for a decreasing labor income–to–net worth 
ratio), the benchmark model predicts lower risky asset shares (compare Figure 1). 
The regression coefficient for the log of net worth predicts exactly the opposite. 
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Thus, for lower levels of net worth, the gap between optimal and empirical asset 
allocation becomes larger, and the welfare losses are also often larger. 
 
Varying the gender variable from male to female increases the individual’s life 
expectancy, and increases the empirical risky asset share for U.S. investors (see 
Table 3).22 The variation in life expectancy yielded ambiguous results in the 
normative model and produced only minor differences in asset allocation. Thus, the 
optimal asset allocation for men and women according to the benchmark model is 
almost identical. But for women, the gap between optimal and empirical asset 
allocation (risky asset share) is smaller due to the positive coefficient for gender. 
Consequently, the welfare losses are smaller for women. 
 
The impact of different assumptions for the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ  is 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data;  
Gender = 0 (male), γ = 1, 2, or 3, δ = 0.97, Age = 50, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 4 here --- 
 
Higher risk aversion is associated with lower losses in welfare.23 The reason for this 
is that while increasing risk aversion, the empirically measured asset allocation stays 
constant, but the benchmark investment in the risky asset decreases. As a result, the 
gap between the optimal risky asset share and the empirical asset share decreases.  
 
The influence of a variation in the subjective discount factor δ  is shown in Figure 5. 
 
                                                 
22  The growth rates for income are assumed to be identical in our U.S. income profiles. 
23  As can be seen from Figure 4, the impact of changes in income and net worth are 
confirmed. The gender effect is also confirmed. Because this is also valid for the 
following variations (except age), we will no longer refer to these effects (except for age). 
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Figure 5: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data;  
Gender = 0 (male), γ = 2, δ = 0.95, 0.97, or 0.99, Age = 50, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 5 here --- 
 
The explanation for this effect is straightforward. A higher δ  makes the individual 
more oriented toward the future; thus, savings, and the potential amount of money 
invested suboptimally, increases. Furthermore, with a higher δ, all future losses are 
less heavily discounted.  
 
Figure 6 shows the impact of different education levels. 
 
Figure 6: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data;  
Gender = 0 (male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, Age = 50, Education = Low, Middle, or High 
 
--- put Figure 6 here --- 
 
Higher education for U.S. investors generally leads to higher welfare losses. This is 
partially caused by the coefficients for the education dummy variables that imply 
adjustments to asset allocation in the opposite direction of the normative model 
predictions. Thus, the higher welfare loss for highly educated individuals can be 
explained by a larger gap between the optimal asset allocation and the empirical one. 
For the lower welfare loss for individuals with low education, another effect is 
responsible (the first would imply higher losses too). Having lower education is 
associated with lower expected income growth. Thus, for the same current income, 
the discounted value of expected labor income is lower for individuals with lower 
education. This leads to higher savings rates, making deviations in asset allocation 
more painful, due to the relatively larger amount saved and suboptimally invested. 




Finally, as the last within-country analysis for the U.S., we investigate age effects in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data; Gender = 0 (male), 
γ = 2, δ = 0.97, Age = 30, 50, or 65, Education = Middle, Labor Income = Median 
(age-specific) 
 
--- put Figure 7 here --- 
 
The magnitude of differences in welfare losses according to age shown in Figure 7 
are difficult to interpret. At different ages, the discounted value of the expected labor 
income stream changes following the curves depicted in Figure 2. Furthermore, the 
income quantiles are different. Finally, the time horizon—and thus the number of 
future welfare losses discounted—is different between different age groups. Thus, 
only some results can be clearly identified. For example, for individuals age 65, the 
welfare losses are the lowest, because the gap between optimal and empirical asset 
allocation is the smallest. Furthermore, there are fewer future periods with welfare 
losses. This also explains to some extent why younger age is associated with higher 
welfare losses. 
 
6.2 Results for German Individuals 
In this section, we repeat the analysis given in section 6.1 for the German EVS data.  
 
Figure 8 shows the effect of a variation in labor income, net worth, and gender for 
German individuals.  
 
Figure 8: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for German (EVS) Data; Gender = 0 (male) 
or 1 (female), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, Age = 50, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 8 here --- 
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We first observe that a variation in income leads to results opposite those found for 
U.S. individuals. Lower income (comparing different curves for given levels of net 
worth) is associated with larger welfare losses. Here the effect that with higher 
income savings and thus potential deviations from optimal asset allocation are lower, 
is stronger than the other effects described for U.S. individuals. Although the—
opposed to the normative benchmark model—negative sign of the coefficient for the 
log of labor income leads to greater deviations from the optimal asset allocation for 
high income individuals, their lower savings overcompensate for this. The combined 
effect of a change in savings and the change in the gap to the optimal asset allocation 
explains the hump-shaped welfare loss curves. First, due to the relatively large 
income, savings are zero and thus welfare losses are also zero. Then, with increasing 
net worth, savings increase, as does the impact of the asset allocation gap. For larger 
levels of net worth, the empirical asset allocation comes closer to the 100% optimal 
result of the normative benchmark (given certain levels of income and wealth), thus 
decreasing the welfare gap. For very large levels of net worth (not shown in Figure 
8), this should reverse again, because optimal asset allocation goes below 100% risky 
assets, whereas the empirical asset allocation still increases. 
 
In the German data, women generally experience higher welfare losses. First, for any 
given current income, the expected discounted value of future labor income is lower, 
due to the gender-specific German calibration of the life cycle income profiles. 
Consequently, women save more, making deviations work on a larger amount 
invested. Additionally, for many parameter constellations, the optimal asset 
allocation is 100% risky. Thus, the negative coefficient for the gender dummy 
variable increases the gap in asset allocation for women, leading to a higher welfare 
loss. 
 
The effects of a change in the assumption about relative risk aversion or the subject 
discount factor confirm U.S. results and thus are not shown here.  
 
The impact of a variation in education is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for German (EVS) Data; Gender = 0 
(male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, Age = 50, Education = Low, Middle, or High 
 
--- put Figure 9 here --- 
 
Although the regression coefficients for the low and high education dummy variables 
show the expected sign, welfare losses are the higher the lower education is. Higher 
losses for those with lower education are driven by their larger savings (due to the 
lower expected income stream for a given current income) overcompensating the 
correct sign of the regression coefficient. The resulting larger basis, on which the 
deviation to the optimal risky asset share works, leads to larger welfare losses. 
 
The final variation in age, depicted in Figure 10, shows similar results as for the 
United States, except for individuals age 65. 
 
Figure 10: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for German (EVS) Data, Gender = 0 
(male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, age = 30, 50, or 65, Education = Middle 
 
--- put Figure 10 here --- 
 
For individuals age 65, the welfare losses are often higher than they are for younger 
individuals. Here, opposite the U.S. results, the steeply falling empirical age–risky-
asset allocation profile leads to larger losses. The empirical risky asset share falls 
much faster in age than required by the benchmark model. 
 
6.3 Comparison of the United States and Germany and Derivation of General 
Results 
Comparing Figures 3 to 7 with Figures 8 to 10, we observe that, for most 
combinations of parameters, Americans experience larger welfare losses than 
Germans due to suboptimal asset allocation. Exceptions can be found in some but not 
all parameter combinations for women, those with lower education, and individuals 
age 65. The major explanation for this finding is the larger gap between the U.S. 
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risky asset share and the optimal one. For many parameter combinations, Americans 
invest a smaller share into the risky asset, although the benchmark model’s solution 
demands the opposite. 
 
Women in the United States are better investors than their male counterparts; in 
Germany, it is the opposite, assuming identical relative risk aversion. Assuming 
heterogeneity in relative risk aversion γ —for example, three for German women and 
two for German men or three for U.S. men and two for U.S. women (although the 
latter assumption runs counter to the bulk of empirical and experimental research)—
can almost make gender-specific differences disappear.  
 
With respect to net worth, being a good investor is associated in the United States 
generally with individuals in the top half of the wealth distribution. Only for older 
investors (age 65) lower wealth improves investment behavior. For Germans, the 
better investors can be found at the lower and upper part of the wealth distribution 
(again with an exception for older investors).  
 
Except for older investors, being in higher income brackets generally leads to worse 
investment performance for U.S. investors, whereas in Germany the opposite holds 
true (for all age groups).  
 
Education worsens investment performance for U.S. investors, whereas for Germans 
slight improvements can be identified.  
 
Assuming that higher relative risk aversion leads to lower welfare losses, assuming a 
higher subjective discount factor increases welfare losses. Thus, to close the 
performance gap between the United States and Germany, one needed higher risk 
aversion and/or a lower subjective discount factor for U.S. investors. 
 
7 Summary and Policy Implications 
The analyses presented in this paper reveal the welfare consequences of suboptimal 
investment behavior for U.S. and German individuals. In general, Germans appear to 
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be better investors in terms of welfare loss arising from suboptimal asset allocation. 
This is surprising, taking into account that stock market participation and the 
engagement in risky investments have a longer tradition in the United States than in 
Germany. Thus, reforming the German system toward more privately managed funds 
may not be a bad idea in general. 
 
However, for many combinations of individual characteristics, our results show large 
welfare losses, reaching more than 100% in relation to wealth (net worth). Thus, 
there is considerable room for improvement. In addition, our model identifies those 
population subgroups that would benefit most from a better asset allocation. Because 
public policy resources are limited, our results can help target those groups for whom 
the return would be largest.   
 
An example for such an analysis is given in Table 4. Combining the results of section 
6 with the empirical population distribution allows us to see which individuals are 
located in the parts of the welfare loss distribution with relatively large losses. Here 
we focus on income and wealth, because section 6 revealed that they were the two 
main drivers of the magnitude of welfare loss. Table 4 shows which proportions of 
the SCF and EVS data sets are located in the multivariate income and wealth 
distribution. The shaded fields indicate those parts of the distribution with relatively 
large welfare losses, as given by Figures 3 and 8. 
 
Table 4: Joint Distribution of Labor Income and Net Worth for the United 
States and Germany and Indication (Shaded Area) of Potentially Large Welfare 
Losses 
 
--- put Table 4 here --- 
 
Similar analyses can be performed across age, gender, and education domains.  
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An important topic for future research is determining which public policy measure or 
mix of measures—for example, investments in financial education24 or advice for 
asset allocation default options in pension plans25—should be implemented to 
achieve the maximum welfare gain. Combining knowledge about the welfare 
contributions of various policy measures with the results on the location of welfare 
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Appendix A: Solving Technique for the Normative Problem  
 
The optimization problem (3)–(6) is solved backward via stochastic dynamic 
programming. The Bellman equation for this problem depends on three state 
variables: time t, cash on hand Wt, and the expected labor income path, represented 
by Lt. The Bellman equation (with V denoting the value function) is given by t = 0, 1 
, …, T – x – 1, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }1 1 1,, max E ,t tt t t t t t t t t tCV W L U C p V W Lα δ + + += + , (A1)
 
subject to constraints (4) through (6). In the last period, the remaining wealth is 
consumed, and the value function is simply given by  
UT–x(WT–x). In general, for CRRA utility, the Lt–state can be reduced by dividing Wt 
through Lt (see Carroll, 2004). But, since our econometric results show that, in 
reality, consumers do not behave exactly according to CRRA, and thus in order to 
integrate empirical asset allocations into the model (which depends on both state 
variables, see section 5.3), the Lt state should not be dropped. Nevertheless, problem 
(A1) is solved by referring explicitly only to the Wt state. The Lt state is considered 
implicitly, because equation (A1) is calculated for each individual separately, thus 
referring to each individual’s expected labor income path. 
 
The Bellman equation (A1) cannot be solved analytically, and hence a numerical 
technique is used. First, at each point in time t, the Wt-state space is discretized into 
I ∈   points Wti, with i = 1, 2, …, I. The upper and lower bounds of this Wti grid 
were chosen to be nonbinding in all periods. The distributions of the risky return Rt 
and the labor income Lt were discretized using Gaussian quadrature methods. Since 
in the last period (i.e., at t = T – x), the value function VT – x(WT – x)  is given by UT–
x(WT–x), the numerical solution algorithm starts at the penultimate period (i.e., at 
t = T – x – 1). For each Wti, equation (A1) is solved with the MATHEMATICA® 6.0 
implemented nonlinear optimizer NMaximize, yielding the optimal decisions 
αti(Wti), Cti (Wti), and the function value of Vt(Wti). Next, a continuous function is 
fitted to the points Vt(Wti), which delivers a continuous approximation of the value 
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function Vt(Wt).26 Finally, the problem is rolled back to the preceding period.
                                                 
26  The fitting algorithm used here guarantees that the relative risk aversion displayed by the 
optimal decisions αti(Wti), Cti (Wti) is inherited to the continuous approximation of the 
value function Vt(Wt). 
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Appendix B: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Age Age of respondent 
# Children Number of children in the household 
Gender                 Dummy for gender, with 0 = male and 1 = female 
Education - 
Low             
Dummy for education category = no degree, on the job training or no 
degree, still in school (EVS) and no high school diploma/GED (SCF) 
Education - 
Middle 
Holdout group for education category (= college degree (Meister, 
Berufs- und Fachakademie), apprenticeship (Lehre), still in 
apprenticeship or college (EVS) and high school diploma or GED or 
some college (SCF)) 
Education - 
High 
Dummy for education category = applied science college degree 
(Fachhochschule) or university degree (EVS) and college degree (SCF) 
Occupation - 
Employed 
Holdout group for occupation = government employee (Beamter), work 
for someone else (Angestellter) or work for someone else (Arbeiter) 
(EVS) and work for someone else (SCF) 
Occupation - 
Unemployed 
Dummy for occupation = unemployed, student or other not employed 
(homemaker, pupil, ...) (EVS) and other groups not working (mainly 
those under 65 and out of the labor force) (SCF) 
Occupation - 
Retired          
Dummy for occupation = retired (Rentner) or retired (Pensionär) (EVS) 
and retired/disabled + (student/homemaker/misc. not working and age 65 
or older) (SCF) 
Income Total amount of pre-tax income 
Labor Income Total amount of pre-tax income, excluding any income or withdrawals 
from investments (financial assets and real estate) 
Owns risky 1 Dummy for % risky 1 > 0 vs. = 0 
% risky 1 Risky financial assets (including directly-held stocks; risky share 
invested in investment funds; mortgage-backed bonds; corporate and 
foreign bonds; risky share invested in trusts, annuities and managed 
investment accounts, quasi-liquid retirement accounts; other financial 
assets (e.g., loans to someone else, future proceed from lawsuits)) 
divided by Assets 
Own risky 2 Dummy for % risky 2 > 0 vs. = 0 
% risky 2 Risky financial assets (risky 1) + House – Debt divided by Net worth 
Owns House        Dummy for house or real estate ownership 
House Total value of houses and real estate 
Assets Total value of assets, including financial assets and real estate, but 
excluding cars and other nonfinancial assets (e.g., paintings) 
In Debt Dummy for Debt > 0 vs. = 0 
Debt Total value of debt 





Table 1: Parameter Calibration for the Benchmark Model 
 
Parameter  Value United States Value Germany 
relative risk aversion γ 2 (1, 3) 2 (1, 3) 
subjective discount factor δ 0.97 (0.95, 0.99) 0.97 (0.95, 0.99) 
survival probability pt 
United States Life 
Tables 2003 
Life Table for 
Germany 
2002/2004 
marginal tax rate  0% 0% 
Log-normal stock return  Rt   
 expected return E(Rt) 1.1151 1.1264 
 standard deviation of return Std(Rt) 0.1996 0.2792 
risk-free return  Rf 1.0361 1.0472 
Inflation π 0.0310 0.0279 
Log-normal labor income  Lt   
 expected growth rates during 





 expected real growth rates during 
 retirement  0 0 
 replacement factor  35% 40% 
 standard deviation during 
 work life  0.19 · E(Lt) 0.05 · E(Lt) 
 standard deviation during 
 retirement  0 0 
 












(weighed) Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Demographics
Age 55.69 19.24 51.04 22.95 56.53 18.78 50.46 16.98 50.43 18.29 50.48 16.09
Age 2 3,469 2,198 3,069.07 2,519.76 3,541.70 2,167.05 2,834 1,793 2,878 1,927 2,807 1,702
Gender 0.65 0.49 0.69 0.53 0.65 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.75 0.43 0.62 0.48
# Children 0.40 0.81 0.51 1.01 0.38 0.79 0.30 0.65 0.29 0.63 0.30 0.65
Education
Low 0.18 0.39 0.30 0.49 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22
Middle 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.60 0.49
High 0.31 0.47 0.10 0.38 0.35 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.35 0.48
Occupation
Employed 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.54 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.60 0.49
Unemployed 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21
Retired 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.52 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48
Income (local currency)
Income 36,186 55,084 16,443 15,969 39,751 59,253 42,757 46,868 27,493 28,535 52,437 53,217
Labor Income 31,556 36,087 15,500 17,176 34,455 38,670 30,743 20,894 22,897 14,743 35,718 22,624
Ln(Labor Income) 10.01 0.89 9.37 0.89 10.13 0.87 10.13 0.65 9.88 0.57 10.30 0.64
Wealth (local currency)
Owns risky 1 0.496 0.510 0.001 0.07 0.585 0.505 0.39 0.49 0 0 0.63 0.48
pecent risky 1 0.142 0.247 0.001 0.07 0.164 0.260 0.09 0.20 0 0 0.15 0.24
Owns risky 2 0.85 0.37 0 0 1.000 0.000 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 0
percent risky 2 0.58 0.35 0 0 0.684 0.267 0.39 0.40 0 0 0.64 0.31
Owns Hose 0.744 0.441 0.02 0.30 0.87 0.35 0.40 0.49 0.003 0.05 0.66 0.47
House Value 146,415 332,759 991 9,826 172,675 357,999 79,151 150,396 312 6,245 129,145 174,636
Assets 263,101 1,084,310 7,053 34,224 309,339 1,177,029 112,886 179,561 15,812 34,763 174,444 205,324
In Debt 0.587 0.493 0.02 0.28 0.69 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.003 0.05 0.39 0.49
Debt 41,081 75,682 995 9,765 48,319 80,786 16,678 52,214 312 6,245 27,057 64,444
Net worth 233,249 1,086,321 8,662 33,574 273,806 1,179,796 96,208 159,525 15,500 34,151 147,388 184,655
Ln(Net worth) 10.95 2.06 7.66 2.15 11.54 1.48 10.15 2.09 8.50 1.95 11.20 1.39




individual has        
no risky 2
N = 4,177





individual has        
no risky 2
N = 149
individual has risky 2
N = 745
 
Table 3: Determinants for Share of Risky Assets (Tobit Regression); Dependent 
Variable: Percent Risky 2 (for definition of variables, see Appendix B) 
coef std. err. coef std. err.
Age 0.0143 0.0040 *** -0.0020 0.0018
Age2 -0.0001 0.00004 *** -0.00003 0.00002
Gender 0.0533 0.0246 ** -0.0372 0.0097 ***
Education Low 0.0852 0.0368 ** -0.0343 0.0199 *
Education High -0.0521 0.0283 * 0.0096 0.0101
Occupation Retired -0.0087 0.0371 0.0276 0.0149 *
Ln(Labor Income) -0.0160 0.0165 -0.0275 0.0088 ***
Ln(Net worth) 0.0735 0.0103 *** 0.2550 0.0033 ***
Labor Income / Net worth -0.0487 0.0083 *** 0.0001 0.00002 ***
Constant -0.4316 0.1564 *** -1.9020 0.0959 ***
Pseudo R2 0.4040 0.3731
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level
SCF USA EVS Germany
 
 
Table 4: Joint Distribution of Labor Income and Net Worth for the United 




0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
0-25 8% 7% 7% 1%
25-50 7% 7% 11% 2%
50-75 9% 9% 0% 7%
75-100 1% 3% 8% 15%
EVS Germany
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
0-25 13% 4% 4% 3%
25-50 7% 8% 5% 6%
50-75 4% 7% 8% 6%


























* Note, the distribution shown here refers to the subpopulation aged 50. Preference assumptions and 
indication of potentially large welfare losses are based on Figure 3 and Figure 8. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Investment into the risky asset as a function in the labor income–to–
cash on hand ratio for German (EVS) data, Gender = 0 (male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, 
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Figure 2: Investment into the risky asset as a function in age for German (EVS) 
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Figure 3: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data;  




























































































































* Dotted vertical lines indicate age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%); age-specific 
quantiles for Labor Income are labeled by  (25%),  (50%) and  (75%). 
 
 47
Figure 4: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data; Gender = 0 (male), 
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* Dotted vertical lines indicate age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%); age-specific 
quantiles for Labor Income are labeled by  (25%),  (50%) and  (75%). 
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Figure 5: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data; Gender = 0 (male), 
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* Dotted vertical lines indicate age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%); age-specific 




Figure 6: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data; Gender = 0 (male), 
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* Dotted vertical lines indicate age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%); age-specific 
quantiles for Labor Income are labeled by  (25%),  (50%) and  (75%). 
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Figure 7: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for U.S. (SCF) Data; Gender = 0 (male), 
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* Age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%) are for age = 30: 12,300; 32,950; 93,100; 
for age = 50: 35,800; 93,800; 170,100; for age = 65: 7,540; 67,020; 275,360 
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Figure 8: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for German (EVS) Data; Gender = 0 (male) 






































































































































* Dotted vertical lines indicate age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%); age-specific 
quantiles for Labor Income are labeled by  (25%),  (50%) and  (75%). 
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Figure 9: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for German (EVS) Data; Gender = 0 
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* Dotted vertical lines indicate age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%); age-specific 
quantiles for Labor Income are labeled by  (25%),  (50%) and  (75%). 
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Figure 10: Welfare Losses, ∆W0 / W0, for German (EVS) Data, Gender = 0 
(male), γ = 2, δ = 0.97, age = 30, 50, or 65, Education = Middle, Labor Income = 
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* Age-specific quantiles for Net worth (25%, 50% and 75%) are for age = 30: 4,438; 15,433; 50,487; 
for age = 50: 13,713; 56,397; 145,921; for age = 65: 15,580; 65,750; 191,312 
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